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Comment
International Minerals & Mining Corp. v. Cificozp
North America, Inc.: A Contractual
Relationship Between Loan Applicant
and Lender
Jason D. Topp
Traditionally, American courts have been unwilling to im-
pose general obligations on parties negotiating contracts unless
one party makes a specific promise to the other.1 Contrary to
this practice, a federal district court in New Jersey recently
held that a bank's acceptance of a commercial loan application
obligates the bank to consider the application in good faith.2 In
International Minerals & Mining Corp. v. Citicorp North
America, Inc.,3 the court thus imposed a general obligation of
good faith and fair dealing on parties during the negotiation
stage of contract formation.
This Comment explores the dimensions and traces the
likely consequences of an IMMCO contract. Part I describes
the status of common law precontractual and lender liability.4
Part II describes the IMMCO reasoning and holding.5 Part III
explores the significance of the IMMCO reasoning,6 criticizes
1. In 1987, Professor Farnsworth asserted that American courts never
impose general obligations on negotiating parties due solely to the negotiation
process:
In recent decades, courts have shown increasing willingness to impose
precontractual liability. I shall group the possible grounds under four
headings. The first three, unjust enrichment resulting from the nego-
tiations, misrepresentation made during the negotiations, and specific
promise during the negotiations, have been recognized by courts in
the United States; the fourth, general obligations arising out of the
negotiations themselves, has not.
E. Allan Farnsworth, Precontractual Liability and Preliminary Agreements:
Fair Dealing and Failed Negotiations, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 217, 222 (1987).
2. International Minerals & Mining Corp. v. Citicorp North America,
Inc., 736 F. Supp. 587, 595 (D.N.J. 1990) [hereinafter IMMCO].
3. 736 F. Supp. 587 (D.N.J. 1990).
4. See infra part I.
5. See infra part II.
6. See infra part III.A.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
the decision,7 and concludes that parties who sufficiently mani-
fest an intention .not to be bound by a contractual relationship
during loan negotiations should remain free from any contrac-
tual obligation.
I. BACKGROUND
A. COMMON LAW PRECONTRACTUAL LIABILITY
A bargain theory contract consists of two elements: mutual
assent and consideration.8 Parties enter into contractual nego-
tiations for the purpose of creating legally enforceable agree-
ments.9 By negative implication, prior to the successful
completion of negotiations, the parties do not create anything
for the legal system to enforce.' 0 This freedom from contract
7. See infra part III.B.
8. Bargain theory contract is the leading type of promise enforced by
contract law. ROBERT S. SUMMERS & ROBERT A. HILmAN, CONTRACT AND RE.
VIEW OBLIGATIONS: THEORY, DOCTRINE, AND PRACTICE 48 (1987). This type of
contract involves two elements: mutual assent and consideration. RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 17 (1979).
The first element, mutual assent, consists of an agreement on essential
terms. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts summarized this element as fol-
lows: "The manifestation of mutual assent to an exchange ordinarily takes the
form of an offer or proposal by one party followed by an acceptance by the
other party or parties." Id. § 22(a).
The second element, consideration, consists of bargained for exchange. "A
performance or return promise is bargained for if it is sought by the promisor
in exchange for [a] promise and is given by the promisee in exchange for that
promise." Id. § 71(2).
9. The purpose of a contract is to create promises which the law recog-
nizes as duties. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (1979). "A con-
tract is a promise, or set of promises, for breach of which the law gives as a
remedy, or the performance of which the law in some way recognizes as a
duty." SAMUEL WILLISTON, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 1 (3d ed. 1957); see RE_
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (1979); RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS§ 1 (1932); cf. 1 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 3 (rev. ed. 1963)
("[A] contract is a promise enforceable at law directly or indirectly," quoted in
JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1-1, at 2
n.1 (3d ed. 1987).
10. Farnsworth, supra note 1, at 221-22 (discussing the fact that the tradi-
tional view of the negotiation process states that parties have the freedom to
negotiate without the risk of liability); Charles L. Knapp, Enforcing a Con-
tract to Bargain, 44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 673, 674-75 (1969) ("Correlative to (but not
necessarily dictated by) the proposition that creation of a contract relation re-
sults in the immediate existence of rights, is the converse: until the stage of
contract is reached, no rights exist because none have been created."); cf. RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 41 (1979); 1 CORBIN, supra note 9, § 38;
Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 729 S.W.2d 768, 813 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) (empha-
sizing that courts use an objective standard in determining whether the parties
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intended to enter into a contractual agreement), cert dismissed, 485 U.S. 994
(1988).
Although negotiations do not give rise to contract liability, negotiating
parties can be held liable under other theories of recovery. For example,
plaintiffs have recovered, prior to the creation of a binding contract, for statu-
tory violations, unjust enrichment, fraud, misrepresentation, and promissory
estoppel. Plaintiffs also may recover under numerous other tort theories. A
quick introduction to each of these theories of recovery sheds light on their
importance.
Statutory law frequently restricts the options of negotiators. Three areas
where federal regulations shroud the negotiation process are: labor trade ne-
gotiations, trade regulation, and improper discrimination. For a discussion of
the scope of these areas, see E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 3.26 (2d ed.
1990) [hereinafter FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS]. The National Labor Relations
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1988), requires that labor negotiations be conducted in
good faith. See generally NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 742-43 (1962) (discussing
duties imposed by the National Labor Relations Act); Continental Ins. Co. v.
NLRB, 495 F.2d 44, 48 (2d Cir. 1974) (discussing the good faith obligation).
In trade regulation, the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1988), places some
duties on negotiating parties. For a discussion of duties under the Sherman
Act, see Donald A. Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman
Act- Conscious Parallelism and Refusals to Deal, 75 HARv. L. REv. 655, 689
(1962) (noting that the Supreme Court has held that "a manufacturer cannot
refuse to deal, or deal only on certain conditions, where the conduct reflects or
is part of 'an attempt to monopolize' forbidden by section 2 of the Sherman
Act").
In terms of the third area, improper discrimination, courts also restrict ne-
gotiations. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e - 2000e-15
(1988), prohibits employers and unions from discriminating on the basis of
race, color, sex, religion or national origin when considering job applications.
See Developments in the Law-Employment Discrimination and Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1109 (1971). Section 1 of the
1866 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1988), prohibits "all racial discrimina-
tion, private as well as public, in the sale or rental of property." Jones v. Al-
fred Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 413 (1968) (emphasis added by court); see
generally Note, Discriminatory Housing Markets, Racial Unconscionability,
and Section 1988: The Contract Buyers League Case, 80 YALE L.J. 516 (1971)
(analyzing § 1982 and issues of racial discrimination in the real estate market).
In the absence of statutory restrictions, plaintiffs can look to the common
law for redress for precontractual wrongdoing. For example, a plaintiff may
recover if the other party unjustly enriched itself due to the negotiations: "A
negotiating party may not with impunity unjustly appropriate such benefits
[received during the negotiation process] to its own use." Farnsworth, supra
note 1, at 229. To constitute unjust enrichment, a party must be enriched by
the receipt of some benefit. See, FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS, supra, § 2.20; Gay
v. Mooney, 50 A. 596 (N.J. 1901) (finding that services rendered to defendant
were not gratuitous and that plaintiffs deserved recovery for those services),
aff'd per curiam, 52 A. 1131 (N.J. 1902). Additionally, the party must retain
the benefit unjustly. See Anderco, Inc. v. Buildex Design, Inc., 538 F. Supp.
1139 (D.D.C. 1982) (no recovery fee for benefit conferred when no proof of un-
just retention of benefit proved). Damages in an unjust enrichment action are
limited to the benefit conferred. Gay v. Mooney, 50 A. at 597.
Fraud can be caused by misrepresentation. See, e.g., State Nat'l Bank v.
Farah Mfg. Co., 678 S.W.2d 661, 680 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984). For examples of mis-
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during negotiations is a fundamental concept in contract law."'
representation in precontractual situations, see Markov v. ABC Transfer &
Storage Co., 457 P.2d 535 (Wash. 1969) (intentional misrepresentation of an in-
tent to renew a lease); In re Slefco, 107 B.R. 628, 644 (E.D. Ark. 1989) (inten-
tional misrepresentation of intent to make additional loans).
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts defines promissory estoppel as
follows:
(1) A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to in-
duce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third per-
son and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if
injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise. The
remedy granted for breach may be limited as justice requires.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1979).
In the widely discussed case of Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 133
N.W.2d 267 (Wis. 1965), the Wisconsin Supreme Court applied promissory es-
toppel to contract negotiations. In the two decades since Red Owl, however,
"its influence [on precontractual liability] has been more marked in the law
reviews than the law reports." Farnsworth, supra note 1, at 237. Cases that
have applied promissory estoppel to the precontractual arena include: Arca-
dian Phosphates, Inc. v. Arcadian Corp., 884 F.2d 69, 73 (2d Cir. 1989) (finding
that material issues of fact existed in promissory estoppel claim arising out of
failed negotiations); Zimmerman v. First Fed. Say. & Loan, 848 F.2d 1047, 1055
(10th Cir. 1988) (allowing recovery of lost profits on a promissory estoppel
claim against a lender); Skycom Corp. v. Telstar Corp. 813 F.2d 810, 817 (7th
Cir. 1987) (remanding promissory estoppel claim for reconsideration by the
parties and the district court); Werner v. Xerox Corp., 732 F.2d 580, 582-84 (7th
Cir. 1984) (upholding promissory estoppel decision based on promises by
Xerox that it would purchase machines from Werner); Vigoda v. Denver Ur-
ban Renewal Auth., 646 P.2d 900, 905 (Colo. 1982) (en banc) (adopting promis-
sory estopel in Colorado).
A negotiating party may also utilize several tort theories to hold another
party liable in the absence of contractual privity. Examples of tort theories in-
clude fraud, intentional misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty, and negli-
gence. High v. McLean Fin. Corp., 659 F. Supp. 1561, 1566-71 (D.D.C. 1987). In
High, the misrepresentation claim was founded on a statement recklessly
made. Id. at 1567; see STEvE H. NICKLES, LENDER LIABILITY: MAJOR CAUSES
AND EFFECTIVE CURES 35 (4th ed. 1990); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 525 (1977). A claim for breach of fiduciary duty can be a basis for liability in
the absence of an agency relationship. NICKLES, supra, at 35 (citing Stone v.
Davis, 419 N.E.2d 1094 (Ohio), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1081 (1981)). When a third
party has knowledge of a contract and interferes with that contract, plaintiffs
sometimes can hold that party liable for tortious interference with contract de-
spite the absence of contractual privity. See Texaco, 729 S.W.2d at 828 (discuss-
ing the knowledge required under this theory).
These theories of recovery impose extensive obligations on negotiating
parties. Thus, any discussion of freedom of negotiations must be made against
the backdrop of these restrictions.
11. "The logic would seem irrefutable: if all contracts are promises, then
the promises that create contracts can be negated by express declarations that
they do not bind the promisor." Wendell H. Holmes, Freedom Not to Contract,
60 TUL. L. REv. 751, 752-53 (1969).
"Adam Smith, Ricardo, Bentham, and John Stuart Mill successively in-
sisted on freedom of bargaining as the fundamental and indispensable requi-
site of progress; and imposed their theories on the educated thought of their
[Vol. 76:131
LENDER LIABILITY
Determining whether a contract exists is therefore a vital first
step in determining contractual liability.
The existence of a contract is equally important for deter-
mining whether the parties owe each other an obligation of
good faith and fair dealing.'2 Courts normally require good
faith only when parties have entered into a valid contract.13
Absent special circumstances, the obligation generally has not
applied to negotiating parties.14 Once a contractual relationship
exists, however, courts may imply a covenant of good faith and
fair dealing even if the parties attempt to disavow the obliga-
tion contractually.' 5
Further, courts and scholars disagree about what consti-
times with a thoroughness not common in economic speculation." Samuel
Williston, Freedom of Contract, 6 CORNELL L.Q. 365, 366 (1921).
12. The obligation of good faith does not apply prior to the existence of a
contractual relationship. Farnsworth, supra note 1, at 239; Dennis M. Patter-
son, Good Faith, Lender Liability and Discretionary Acceleration: Of Llewel-
lyn, Wittgenstein and the Uniform Commercial Code, 68 TEX. L. REV. 169, 185
n.123 (1989) (explaining that the UCC does not impose a good faith obligation
in absence of a contract); see Holmes, supra note 11, at 752.
13. See Holmes, supra note 11, at 752.
14. One example of a special circumstance is when parties negotiate con-
tract modifications. See T & S Brass and Bronze Works, Inc. v. Pic-Air, Inc.,
790 F.2d 1098, 1105 (4th Cir. 1986) (explaining that good faith requires a legiti-
mate commercial reason for a party to seek a contract modification); Roth
Steel Prods. v. Sharon Steel Corp., 705 F.2d 134, 145-46 (6th Cir. 1983) (finding
that the good faith standard applies to contract modifications and requires two
inquiries: (1) whether the party's conduct conforms with the standard of rea-
sonable commercial standards of fair dealing, and (2) whether the party sought
the modification for honest purposes).
15. Though courts are sometimes willing to enforce such agreements, see
Winterstein v. Wilcom, 293 A.2d 821 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1972) (enforcing ex-
culpatory agreement with respect to the use of a drag strip), two major excep-
tions render such provisions invalid. The first exception involves parties with
disparate bargaining power. Ellis and Gray argue that if all lenders required
an exculpatory provision, courts would refuse to enforce the provision due to
this exception. See Nan S. Ellis & John A. Gray, Lender Liability for Negli-
gently Processing Loan Applications, 92 DIcK. L. REv. 363, 390 (1988). The
second exception involves businesses operating in the public interest. Winter-
stein, 293 A.2d at 825 (citing Tunkle v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 383 P.2d
441, 445-46 (Cal. 1963)). Factors for determining whether this second excep-
tion applies include: whether the business is of the type generally thought
suitable for public regulation, whether the service performed is one of great
importance to the public, whether the party holds itself out as willing to per-
form the service for any member of the public who meets certain minimum
standards, whether one party has superior bargaining power, and whether the
property of one party is placed under the control of the party seeking exculpa-
tion. Id A disappointed loan applicant would have a legitimate argument
under either of these exceptions to the enforceability of exculpatory provi-
sions. See Djowharzadeh v. City Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 646 P.2d 616, 619
(Okla. Ct. App. 1982) (emphasizing that the public invests enormous public
1991]
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tutes good faith.16 In recent years, commentators have strug-
gled to apply this "duty of good faith" to lenders.' 7 These
discussions have concentrated on three sources of law that de-
fine the obligation of good faith and fair dealing: the Uniform
Commercial Code, the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, and
the common law. The Uniform Commercial Code applies a
subjective standard of good faith'8 to most commercial transac-
trust in banks, that banks have a virtual financial monopoly on the commu-
nity, and that the legislature carefully regulates banks).
16. Two widely cited articles generally discussing the obligation of good
faith are: E. Allan Farnsworth, Good Faith Performance and Commercial
Reasonableness Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 30 U. CHI. L. REv. 666
(1963); and Robert S. Summers, "Good Faith" in General Contract Law and
the Sales Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REV. 195
(1968) [hereinafter Summers, Good Faith Under the UCCj. Several more re-
cent articles have examined the obligation of good faith. See e.g., Steven J.
Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty Perform in Good
Faith, 94 HARV. L. REV. 369 (1980); Steven J. Burton, Good Faith Performance
of a Contract Within Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 67 IowA L.
REV. 1 (1981); Steven J. Burton, More on Good Faith Performance of a Con-
tract A Reply to Professor Summers, 69 IowA L. REV. 497 (1984); B.J. Reiter,
Good Faith in Contracts, 17 VAL. U. L. REV. 705 (1983); Robert S. Summers,
The General Duty of Good Faith-Its Recognition and Conceptualization, 67
CORNELL L. REV. 810 (1982) [hereinafter Summers, The General Duty of Good
Faith].
17. For examples of articles discussing this duty of good faith, see Alan A.
Blakeboro & Rex Heeseman, Good Faith Duties and Tort Remedies in Lender
Liability Litigation, 15 W. ST. U. L. REV. 617 (1988); Werner F. Ebke & James
R. Griffin, Good Faith and Fair Dealing in Commercial Lending Transactions:
From Covenant to Duty and Beyond, 49 OHio ST. L.J. 1237 (1989); Peter A.
Forgosh, Good Faith and the Asset Based Lender, N.J. ST. B.J., Summer 1986,
at 28; Patterson, supra note 12; Cary Smith, Breach of Good Faith as an Ex-
pansive Basis for Lender Liability Claims: An Idea Whose Time Has Come-
and Gone?, 42 RUTGERS L. REV. 177 (1989); Mark L. Snyderman, What's So
Good About Good Faith? The Good Faith Performance Obligation in Commer-
cial Lending, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1335 (1988); William P. Young & R. William
Wyand, The Sanctity of Contract-in Good Faith, MD. B.J., May/June 1989, at
2; Susan D. Gresham, Special Project, "Bad Faith Breach": A New and Grow-
ing Concern for Financial Institutions, 42 VAND. L. REV. 891 (1989); Jill Pride
Anderson, Note, Lender Liability for Breach of the Obligation of Good Faith
Performance, 36 EMORY L.J. 917 (1987); Kenneth J. Goldberg, Note, Lender
Liability and Good Faith, 68 B.U. L. REV. 653 (1988); Note, Lender Liability:
Breach of Good Faith in Lending and Related Theories, 64 N.D. L. REV. 273
(1988); Jane L. Rodda, Note, The Role of Good Faith in Lender Liability Suits:
Rising Star or Fading Gadfly?, 31 ARIz. L. REV. 939 (1989); Brad Schacht,
Note, Bad Faith Lenders, 60 U. COLO. L. REV. 417 (1989).
18. "'Good faith' means honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction con-
cerned." U.C.C. § 1-201(19) (1989). This standard is applied to all contracts
through UCC § 1-203: "Every contract or duty within this Act imposes an obli-
gation of good faith in its performance or enforcement." U.C.C. § 1-203 (1989).
Some debate does exist as to whether UCC §§ 1-203 and 1-208 apply a sub-
jective or objective standard. Although some courts have been willing to im-
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tions. This standard requires "a state of mind" in which "[a]
party is advantaged only if [that party] acted with innocent ig-
norance or lack of suspicion." 19 In contrast, the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts adopts an objective standard of good faith
and fair dealing.20 An objective standard requires decency, fair-
ness, or reasonableness in performance or enforcement.2 1 The
common law provides a third source for defining good faith.
Common law definitions vary widely.22
pose an objective component to these sections, see Brown v. Avemco Inv.
Corp., 603 F.2d 1367, 1375-80 (9th Cir. 1979), the vast majority of cases hold
that the UCC obligation is purely subjective. See generally NICKLES, supra
note 10, at 133-48. For examples of cases applying a subjective good faith test,
see Watseka First Nat'l Bank v. Ruda, 552 N.E.2d 775, 779 (Ill. 1990) (adopting
an "honest belief" standard); Rigby Corp. v. Boatmen's Bank & Trust Co., 713
S.W.2d 517, 533 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (explaining that-this standard is far less
stringent than the commercial test of reasonableness and fair dealing).
A plaintiff forced to argue an objective standard of good faith under UCC
§ 1-203 faces a very difficult challenge. The Code defines good faith as "hon-
esty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned." U.C.C. § 1-201(19)
(1989). This standard contains no language supporting an objective interpreta-
tion. Additionally, earlier drafts of this definition contained an objective stan-
dard, but the drafters then modified it to the final form. Robert Braucher, The
Legislative History of the Uniform Commercial Code, 58 COLUM. L. REv. 798,
812 (1958); Farnsworth, supra note 16, at 671. Thus, both the language of the
section and the history of its drafting support a subjective interpretation.
In a sales context, the UCC subjects merchants to an objective standard of
good faith. U.C.C. § 2-103(1)(b) (1989). This standard, however, does not apply
to debtor-creditor relationships. See U.C.C. § 2-104 (1989); Van Bibber v. Nor-
ris, 419 N.E.2d 115, 122-23 (Ind. 1981).
19. Farnsworth, supra note 16, at 668. Commentators have described this
as "the rule of 'the pure heart and the empty head."' Braucher, supra note 18,
at 812.
20. "Every contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair
dealing in its performance and its enforcement." RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF
CoNTRACTS § 205 (1979). Comment (a) to this section defines "good faith" as
follows:
Good faith performance or enforcement of a contract emphasizes
faithfulness to an agreed common purpose and consistency with the
justified expectations of the other party; it excludes a variety of types
of conduct characterized as involving "bad faith" because they violate
community standards of decency, fairness, or reasonableness.
I& § 205 cmt. a (1979).
21. Larese v. Creamland Dairies, Inc., 767 F.2d 716, 717-18 (10th Cir. 1985)
(finding that the obligation imposes a duty of reasonableness on a franchisor
when determining whether to consent to a franchise sale); Pizza Management,
Inc. v. Pizza Hut, Inc., 737 F. Supp. 1154, 1179 (D. Kan. 1990) (A "breach [of
duty] occurs when a party's actions are commercially unreasonable."); Cen-
tronics Corp. v. Genicom Corp., 562 A.2d 187, 193 (N.H. 1989) (explaining that
a party with discretion in a satisfaction contract owes a duty to observe reason-
able limits in the exercise of that discretion).
22. The good faith concept arose in the context of "satisfaction cases" in
which one party's performance was contingent on that party being satisfied
1991]
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Given these three methods of defining the duty of good
faith and its varying interpretations in the common law, opin-
ions vary regarding what the duty requires. 23 This uncertainty
with the performance of the other party. See Mattei v. Hopper, 330 P.2d 625,
626-27 (Cal. 1958) (holding that a clause requiring a contractor to obtain satis-
factory leases qualifies as consideration because the party with the power to
terminate the contract must exercise its power in good faith). Courts imposed
an implied duty of good faith on the non-performing party to combat argu-
ments that this type of contract was unsupported by consideration. Id at 627.
Courts have been willing to impose a subjective standard, Tiffany v. Pa-
cific Sewer Pipe Co., 182 P. 428, 430 (Cal. 1919) (holding that there was "no
sufficient evidence to support the finding that the defendant was satisfied with
his work"); an objective standard, Collins v. Vickter Manor, Inc., 306 P.2d 783,
788 (Cal. 1957) (adopting the "reasonable person" standard); or a combination
of the two standards, K.M.C. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752, 761 (6th Cir.
1985) (applying dual standard of reasonableness and honesty).
Often, the courts apply sweeping definitions which seem to go beyond
either standard. Many definitions of good faith appear quite abstract, sweep-
ing and formalistic. For a general listing, see FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS, supra
note 10, § 7.17; see also Conoco v. Inman Oil Co., 774 F.2d 895, 908 (8th Cir.
1985) ("Th[e] implied covenant imposes upon each party the duty to do noth-
ing destructive of the other party's right to enjoy the fruits of the contract and
to do everything that the contract presupposes they will do to accomplish its
purpose.") (citations omitted); Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hosp., 710
P.2d 1025, 1038 (Ariz. 1985) ("The covenant requires that neither party do any-
thing that will injure the right of the other to receive the benefits of their
agreement."); Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 364 N.E.2d 1251, 1257
(Mass. 1977) (stating that "neither party shall do anything which will have the
effect of destroying or injuring the right of the other party to receive the fruits
of the contract") (citations omitted).
Commentators even have argued that it makes no difference which stan-
dard courts apply. Because defendants rarely will admit subjective bad faith,
plaintiffs must prove it through the same external criteria that plaintiffs use
under an objective standard. See JAMES J. WITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNI-
FORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 25-3, at 1192-94 (3d ed. 1988).
23. See supra notes 12-22 and accompanying text. The appropriate role
for the duty of good faith and fair dealing has sparked so much dispute be-
cause the issue goes to the heart of the distinction between contract law and
tort law. The basic difference between tort and contract law lies in whether
society or individuals determine legal duties. Society determines tort duties.
See 21st Century Properties Co. v. Carpenter Insulation & Coatings Co., 694 F.
Supp. 148, 151 (D. Md. 1988) (indicating that "[t]ort rules are evolved from con-
siderations of overriding public policy"); Clarence Morris, Custom and Negli-
gence, 42 COLUM. L. REV. 1147, 1153 (1942) ("The hornbook 'test' of negligence
is: Did the defendant act as an ordinarily prudent [person] would in like cir-
cumstances?"). Individuals determine contract duties. See supra note 10 and
accompanying text. An objective standard of good faith injects a societal stan-
dard of reasonableness on an agreement between individuals. See Clayton P.
Gillette, Limitations on the Obligation of Good Faith, 1981 DUKE L.J. 619, 650
(1981) ("The result [of an objective interpretation of good faith] may be an in-
dividualized jurisprudence in which judicial discretion exists to alter risks pre-
viously allocated between the parties."); Snyderman, supra note 17, at 1338
(arguing that judicial use of the obligation of good faith and fair dealing has
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imposes a difficult burden on courts interpreting the duty and
on businesses trying to act in accordance with it.
This analytical difficulty surrounding the obligation of good
faith is compounded further by questions about whether a con-
tract exists between the parties.24 The classic model of two par-
ties negotiating a purchase price25 may accurately depict the
process by which Aunt Ida sells a blender at her garage sale but
bears little resemblance to the process by which a multi-million
dollar loan or a large sale of real estate is made:
Major contractual commitments are typically set out in a lengthy doc-
ument, or in a set of documents, signed by the parties .. .and ex-
changed more or less simultaneously at a closing. The terms are
reached by negotiations, usually face to face over a considerable pe-
riod of time and often involving corporate officers, bankers, engineers,
accountants, lawyers, and others.2 6
caused good faith to become a loose cannon that courts have used to further
their views of justice). An objective standard of good faith thus undermines a
fundamental precept of contract law-that individuals, not society, should de-
termine their respective obligations.
The legal community generally agrees that the imposition of societal stan-
dards on contracts is necessary in some situations, such as a contract that con-
travenes public policy, see, e.g., Myers v. Western-Southern Life Ins. Co., 849
F.2d 259, 261 (6th Cir. 1988) (holding that if the purpose of a contract is to cre-
ate a situation detrimental to the public interest, then it is unenforceable);
Bond v. Charison, 374 N.W.2d 423, 429 (Minn. 1985) (indicating that a contract
for fraudulent sale of securities violates public policy); Sternamen v. Metropol-
itan Life Ins. Co., 62 N.E. 763, 764 (N.Y. 1902) (holding that parties cannot
make a binding contract that violates public policy); or a retail contract that
takes advantage of an unsophisticated buyer, see U.C.C. § 2-103(1)(b) (1989).
Beyond such specialized situations, however, traditionalists cringe at the
thought of societal standards altering agreements made in an arms-length
commercial setting. See Snyderman, supra note 17, at 1346 (supporters of im-
posing community standards into contracts "have shifted the presumption de-
cidedly away from the text of the contract"). Other commentators argue that
such interference is necessary. See Farnsworth, supra note 16, at 672 (good
faith must include an objective standard); Summers, Good Faith under the
UCC, supra note 16, at 210-12 (criticizing the UCC standard of good faith);
Michael L. Weissman, Lender Liability, the Obligation to Act in Good Faith
and Deal Fairly, J. COM. BANK LENDING, Dec. 1986, at 2-3.
24. See generally IAN R. MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT: AN IN-
QUIRY INTO MODERN CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS 4-10 (1980) (discussing the
complexities involved in defining a contract).
25. "Usually an essential prerequisite to the formation of contract is an
agreement: a mutual manifestation of assent to the same terms. This mutual
assent ordinarily is established by a process of offer and acceptance." JOHN D.
CALAMARI & JOSEPH D. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CoNTRAcTs § 2-1, at 25 (3d ed.
1987); see Dura-Wood Treating Co. v. Century Forest Indus., 675 F.2d 745, 750-
51 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 459 U.S. 865 (1982); Eisenberg v. Continental Casu-
alty Co., 180 N.W.2d 726, 734 (Wis. 1970); Hahnemann Medical College & Hosp.
v. Hubbard, 406 A.2d 1120, 1122 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979).
26. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTs, supra note 10, § 3.5 (2d ed. 1990).
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These procedures blur the distinction between precontractual
and contractual relationships. Under the classic method of
finding a contract, courts often are forced to make decisions
based on an inaccurate factual model.27
In order to cope with this weakness in the classic contract
model, parties occasionally enter into agreements that cannot
readily be categorized as either a "contract" or "no contract."
These agreements include: a preliminary agreement with open
terms,28 a preliminary agreement to negotiate,29 an agreement
to engage in a transaction, 30 and a stop-gap agreement. 31 These
agreements define obligations that lie somewhere between no
obligation and a finalized contract.
Courts occasionally hesitate to enforce these interim agree-
ments. Such agreements raise questions about intent to be
bound, sufficient definiteness, authority of the negotiators, ap-
plicability of the statute of frauds, and interpretation of the
agreement's language. 32 Courts are most willing to enforce
such agreements when some sort of public interest supports im-
plementing them, such as in labor negotiations. 33
B. LENDER LIABiLTY
A lender faces enormous potential exposure in a loan set-
ting.34 As a result, ambiguities in the law governing lending
contracts can have serious financial consequences. Recent
27. Farnsworth, supra note 1, at 285. Farnsworth recognizes the factual
shortcomings of the classic model of contract formation but argues that the
model serves the legal system well anyway. Id. at 285-87.
28. This type of agreement sets out the basic terms of a deal and binds the
parties to those terms. The parties further agree to negotiate the remaining
terms of the agreement. See id at 250.
29. This type of agreement does not bind the parties with respect to any
terms, but the parties agree to work toward an ultimate agreement. See id at
251.
30. The loan commitment letter typifies this type of agreement. It binds
the parties but leaves the actual creation and execution of the contract for
later. See id
31. A stop-gap agreement may exist, for example, when a target company
of a takeover bid agrees to continue conducting business in a manner that pre-
serves the value of the company. See id at 252.
32. See id. at 252-53 (citing cases).
33. Id at 261.
34. In delineating the extent of the ever-expanding lender liability area,
defining the component parts of the subject becomes important. In his book,
Professor Nickles divides the subject of lender liability into eight broad areas:
processing the loan; contracting to loan; managing and policing the loan; cap-
ping the loan; calling the loan; collecting-the loan; confidential and fiduciary
relations; and accounting to the debtor's other creditors. NICKLES, supra note
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shifts in contract and tort law, for example, have delivered a
10. Plaintiffs successfully have imposed liability in each of these areas. A
brief introduction to each of these areas follows.
"Processing the loan application" is discussed throughout this Comment.
Courts have begun to widen the duty of care during loan processing. See Hill
v. Equitable Bank, 655 F. Supp. 631, 648 (D. Del. 1987) (holding that a lender
can be liable for negligent misrepresentation during loan application process-
ing), affl'd, 851 F.2d 691 (3d Cir. 1988), cert denied, 488 U.S. 1008 (1989). Lend-
ers also can be held liable for intentional torts during loan processing. In High
v. McLean Financial Corp., 659 F. Supp. 1561 (D.D.C. 1987), the defendants as-
sured plaintiffs that their loan would go through but then refused to lend
when they were unable to broker the loan. The court upheld the plaintiffs'
claims for breach of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA), 15 U.S.C.
§ 1691 (1988), fraud and intentional misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary
duty, and negligence. High, 659 F. Supp. at 1570-71. The court dismissed the
breach of contract claim. The fraud claim was sustained based on an allega-
tion that the defendants recklessly made assurances of the likely success of
the loan application. The breach of fiduciary duty claim was based on an alle-
gation that the bank was acting as the plaintiffs' agent. The negligence claim
was sustained based on negligent processing and negligent failure to inform
the applicants about the decision-making process in determining whether to
lend. I& at 1570.
In the loan application process, if special circumstances warrant, courts
sometimes hold lenders to a fiduciary duty. After approving a borrower's
mortgage application, the lender in Stone v. Davis, 419 N.E.2d 1094 (Ohio
1981), gave the borrower a "Regulation Z" disclosure form. A clause in the
form asked the borrower to indicate whether the borrower was interested in
mortgage insurance. Id at 1096. The plaintiffs indicated that they were inter-
ested in the insurance, but the lender failed to take any steps to procure the
insurance. The court held that this factual situation gave rise to a fiduciary
duty: "[W]e hold that, in broaching the subject of mortgage insurance to a
loan customer, a lender has a duty to advise the customer as to how this insur-
ance may be procured." Id. at 1099. Courts also have applied this duty to hold
a lender responsible for negligence in advising a customer about financial deci-
sions. Production Credit Ass'n v. Vodak, 441 N.W.2d 338, 344-45 (Wis. Ct. App.
1989).
The basic issues in a "contract to loan" case are similar to those encoun-
tered in a first-year contracts course. Some examples of these issues include:
whether a contract was formed, see J. Russell Flowers, Inc. v. Itel Corp., 495 F.
Supp. 88, 91-92 (N.D. Miss. 1980); whether consideration existed, Carrico v.
Delp, 490 N.E.2d 972, 974-75 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986); whether a contract has been
breached, Runnemade Owners, Inc. v. Crest Mortgage Corp., 861 F.2d 1053,
1056-58 (7th Cir. 1988); whether anticipatory repudiation has occurred, Glatt v.
Bank of Kirkwood Plaza, 383 N.W.2d 473, 479-80 (N.D. 1986); whether damages
are due, United Cal. Bank v. Prudential Ins. Co.,681 P.2d 390, 447-49 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1983) (because lender breached contract to provide permanent financing
for a hotel, plaintiff was awarded its equity, $25 million); and whether a bor-
rower has a duty to mitigate damages, 999 v. C.I.T. Corp., 776 F.2d 866, 871 (9th
Cir. 1985).
"Managing and policing the loan" involves situations where a lender, in
monitoring a business which owes it a debt, becomes so involved in the opera-
tion of the debtor-business that it may be held liable for business decisions.
See NICKLES, supra note 10, at 53-88. The leading case in this area is State Na-
tional Bank v. Farah Manufacturing. Co., 678 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984),
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sting to lending institutions. 35 Five of the ten largest civil judg-
where the lender pressured Farah to make changes in management. Farah
sued, and the jury awarded $18,947,348.77 for Farah on grounds of misrepre-
sentation, duress, and tortious interference with business relations. The Texas
Court of Appeals affirmed every aspect of the jury verdict. Id. at 698.
"Capping the loan" cases typically involve a line of credit in an ongoing
debtor-creditor relationship. NICKLES, supra note 10, at 89-108. When the
lender decides to stop funding the debtor, this decision can have devastating
consequences for the debtor. Courts therefore have been sympathetic to argu-
ments that such decisions were made in bad faith, see K.M.C. Co. v. Irving
Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752, 759-60 (6th Cir. 1985), or that such decisions made
lenders liable under a promissory estoppel theory, see Yankton Prod. Credit
Ass'n v. Larsen, 365 N.W.2d 430, 433-34 (Neb. 1985).
"Calling the loan" involves acceleration clauses in loan agreements. NICK-
LES, supra note 10, at 109-48. An acceleration clause gives the lender a right to
demand the entire amount owed by the debtor if the debtor defaults. The pur-
pose of these clauses is to allow the lender to obtain a legal remedy against the
debtor in one proceeding, rather than being forced to institute a lawsuit every
time payment is in default. This decision to accelerate the obligation is re-
stricted by a duty of good faith. Rigby Corp. v. Boatmen's Bank & Trust Co.,
713 S.W.2d 517, 526-27 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986). A small minority of courts have
held that the breach of this good faith limitation can by itself be a tort. See
Reid v. Key Bank, Inc., 821 F.2d 9, 15 (1st Cir. 1987); First Nat'l Bank v.
Twombly, 689 P.2d 1226, 1230 (Mont. 1984).
"Collecting the loan" cases revolve around creditors' remedies issues.
These issues include: wrongful set-off, Briggs v. Southern Bakeries Co., 182
S.E.2d 459, 462-63 (Ga. 1971), and torts arising in the collections process, Cobb
v. Midwest Recovery Bureau Co., 295 N.W.2d 232, 238 (Minn. 1980).
"Paying for trust and confidence" includes confidential and fiduciary rela-
tionships. NICKLES, supra note 10, at 233. A fiduciary relationship makes it
easier for the plaintiff to impose liability under other theories. Peoples Bank
& Trust Co. v. Lala, 392 N.W.2d 179, 189-91 (Iowa Ct. App. 1986) (holding that
the bank had a duty to disclose that an unencumbered homestead was judg-
ment-proof). A fiduciary relationship normally does not arise out of a lender-
debtor relationship. See, e.g., In re Letterman Bros. Energy Sec. Litig., 799
F.2d 967, 975 (5th Cir. 1985), cert denied, 480 U.S. 918 (1987); Capitol Fed. Say.
& Loan Ass'n, 642 P.2d 21, 23 (Colo. Ct. App. 1981). Such a relationship, how-
ever, can arise out of a course of dealing when the borrower has placed trust
in the lender. Deist v. Wachholz, 678 P.2d 188, 192-95 (Mont. 1984). A fiduci-
ary relationship also can arise when the lender controls the borrower's assets.
Blue Line Coal Co. v. Equibank, 683 F. Supp. 493, 496-97 (E.D. Pa. 1988).
"Accounting to other creditors" involves the ways in which a lender can
be liable to third parties. NICKLES, supra note 10, at 295-457. These issues
arise when a lender dominates a borrower's business to the point that courts
are willing to hold the creditor liable for the debtor's action. The most ex-
treme case of this type is United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550
(11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 752 (1991), where the court held that a
creditor of an operator of a facility may incur cleanup liability under the Com-
prehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act
("CERCLA") if that creditor's "involvement with the management of the fa-
cility is sufficiently broad to support the inference that it could affect hazard-
ous waste disposal decisions if it so chose." Id. at 1558.
35. Lender liability has delivered a sting in two ways: in the size of the
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ments in 1987 involved lender liability claims.3 6 The impact of
these judgments extends beyond the dollar amounts awarded.
Such judgments encourage litigation. Even if potential borrow-
ers' claims fail, the cost to lenders of defending such claims is
enormous.
37
In recent years, lenders have been liable for statutory vio-
lations3s and torts, including fraud,39 duress, 40 tortious interfer-
ence with business relations,4 ' prima facie tort,42 breach of
judgments, see inkfra note 36, and in the variety of theories by which plaintiffs
have successfully imposed liability, see supra note 34.
36. See Rodda, supra note 17, at 939 & n.4. All of these judgments were
over $50 million dollars. See, e.g., Penthouse Int'l v. Dominion Fed. Say. &
Loan Ass'n, 665 F. Supp. 301 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) ($129 million compensatory dam-
ages), affd in part, rev'd in :part, 855 F.2d 963 (2d Cir. 1988). A sixth judg-
ment involved fraud by the borrower. F.D.I.C. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 691 F.
Supp. 87 (N.D. Ill. 1987) ($25 million in compensatory damages, $25 million in
punitive damages), aff'd in par4 rev'd in part, 877 F.2d 614 (6th Cir. 1989),
cert denied, 110 S. Ct. 1524 (1990).
37. For a discussion of the cost problems associated with civil litigation,
see BROOKINGS INST., JUSTICE FOR ALL: REDUCING COSTS AND DELAY IN CIVIL
LIGATIoNS 5-7 (1989).
38. For example, a secured lender may be liable for hazardous waste
cleanup under CERCLA § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1988), when the lender's in-
volvement is such that it could have exercised control over the debtor's busi-
ness. See Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1557-59. Courts have applied the state
uniform fraudulent conveyance acts to void liens created in a leveraged buy-
out. See United States v. Tabor Court Realty Corp., 803 F.2d 1289, 1296 (3d
Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1005 (1987). Courts have voided foreclosure
sales of collateral property made shortly before the borrower filed bankruptcy
under the fraudulent transfer provisions of the federal Bankruptcy Act. 11
U.S.C. § 548 (1988). See Durrett v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., 621 F.2d 201, 204
(5th Cir. 1980) (applying pre-1978 law); contra In re Madrid, 727 F.2d 1197,
1199 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that foreclosure sale is not a transfer under
§ 548). Courts have equitably subordinated lender claims during bankruptcy
under 11 U.S.C. § 510(c) (1988). See In re Slefco, 107 B.R. 628, 644 (Bankr. E.D.
Ark. 1989) (The bank told a debtor to "ride out" suppliers until the debtor
harvested his crops, resulting in a $270,000 unsecured debt to those suppliers.
Once its collateral was harvested, the bank forced the debtor into bankruptcy,
leaving the suppliers out of luck. The court reacted by relegating the bank's
security interest to "the bottominmost rung" of claims.).
39. Fraud consists of misrepresenting fact, opinion, or law for the purpose
of inducing another person to act or to refrain from acting in reliance upon the
misrepresentation. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 525, 526 (1977).
A leading lender liability case of fraud, State National Bank v. Farah Mfg. Co.,
678 S.W.2d 661, 680-82 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984), involved a lender who falsely
stated an intention to declare a default for the purpose of influencing the elec-
tion of the director of the company. In fact the lender had made no such deci-
sion. I&i at 686. Courts have held that both actual and constructive fraud
constitute a violation. See Jackson v. Seymour, 71 S.E.2d 181, 185 (Va. 1952)
(holding that "constructive fraud is a breach of a legal or equitable duty").
40. See Farah Mfg., 678 S.W.2d at 686.
41. See, e.g., Melamed v. Lake County Nat'l Bank, 727 F.2d 1399, 1403-04
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fiduciary duty4 3 and negligent misrepresentation.4 4 Lenders
also have been liable for breach of contract 45 and for breaching
a contractual obligation of good faith and fair dealing.46 Before
the 1986 case of Jacques v. First National Bank,47 however, a
debtor-creditor relationship normally was a prerequisite to a
successful lender liability case.48
Jacques, however, imposed tort liability on a lender for acts
occurring prior to the creation of a debtor-creditor relation-
ship.49 The Jacques court based tort liability in part on a con-
tractual relationship between the parties.50 Although not cited
(6th Cir. 1984) (finding sufficient evidence for a tortious interference claim
when the bank implemented an extensive plan in an attempt to salvage the
debtor-company); Walsh v. Glendale Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 81 Cal. Rptr. 804,
812 (Ct. App. 1969) (cause of action exists for misrepresenting the size of mort-
gagee's debt); Peacock v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 432 So. 2d 142, 144
& n.2 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (finding liability for physically invading a deal-
ership for the primary purpose of driving the debtor out of business); First
Wyo. Bank v. Mudge, 748 P.2d 713, 715-17 (Wyo. 1988) (finding liability for tor-
tious interference with contract when bank induced a borrower to violate a
purchase agreement in order to obtain priority over another security interest).
42. The elements of this cause of action include: intentional conduct; spe-
cific intent to injure the plaintiff; injury to the plaintiff; and absence of suffi-
cient justification. Rigby Corp. v. Boatmen's Bank & Trust Co., 713 S.W.2d
517, 543 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986); Porter v. Crawford & Co., 611 S.W.2d 265, 268
(Mo. Ct. App. 1980).
43. See supra note 34.
44. Cy. Berkline Corp. v. Bank of Miss., 453 So. 2d 699, 702 (Miss. 1984)
(reversing the dismissal of a complaint).
45. See, e.g., First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Caudle, 425 So. 2d 1050 (Ala.
1982). The significant aspect of this case involved the fact that the lender re-
ceived no fees in exchange for agreeing to help a borrower obtain a subsidized
loan from the Department of Housing and Urban Development. Id. at 1052.
The court held that a contract to obtain a subsidized loan did exist. Id. The
bank's promise was supported by consideration because the bank would re-
ceive a one percent origination fee for making any loan resulting from the ap-
plication. Id For a discussion of the general contract to loan issues, see supra
notes 28-33 and accompanying text.
46. K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752, 759-60 (6th Cir. 1985).
For a general discussion of the obligation, see supra notes 16-23 and accompa-
nying text.
47. 515 A.2d 756 (Md. 1986).
48. Commentators have claimed that all successful lender liability cases
involve a debtor-creditor relationship. See Ellis & Gray, supra note 15, at 369.
This claim is incorrect. In 1982, the Alabama Supreme Court held a lender lia-
ble under a contract theory for mistakenly telling a loan applicant that a subsi-
dized loan from the department of Housing and Urban Development had been
granted. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Caudle, 425 So. 2d 1050 (Ala. 1982).
For description of Caudle, see supra note 45 and infra notes 66-69 and accom-
panying text.
49. Jacques, 515 A.2d at 765.
50. Id. at 761-62.
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in IMMCO, Jacques used an identical analysis to find a contract
to process a loan application.51 An examination of Jacques thus
sheds light on the IMMCO approach to the relationship be-
tween loan applicant and lender.
C. JACQUES V. FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF MARYLAND
After processing Margaret and Robert Jacques' loan appli-
cation, the defendant lender determined that the plaintiffs
were eligible for a loan of less than half the amount they re-
quested.52 Plaintiffs brought suit against the bank on a number
of theories, including a tort-based claim for negligent process-
ing of the loan application.5 3 The jury found the bank negli-
gent and awarded $10,000 in compensatory damages.M A
divided intermediate appellate court reversed, holding that a
lender owes no duty to a loan applicant prior to a contractual
relationship. 55
The Maryland Court of Appeals 5 6 reinstated the trial court
verdict, holding that the defendant lender did owe a duty of
51. Compare infra notes 56-65 and accompanying text (describing the rea-
soning the Jacques court used in finding a contractual relationship between a
mortgage applicant and a lender), with infra notes 86-96 and accompanying
text (describing the IMMCO reasoning).
52. Jacques, 515 A.2d at 757. After processing the loan, the bank deter-
mined the plaintiffs qualified for a loan of only $74,000. Subsequently, the
bank informed the plaintiffs that because of an error in calculating eligibility,
plaintiffs only qualified for a loan of $41,400. Id Plaintiffs were forced to take
personal loans from relatives and a $50,000 short-term loan from the bank to
make the increased down payment on their house. Id The plaintiffs found
themselves in a vulnerable financial position due to their purchase agreement.
Under the purchase agreement the plaintiffs made a $30,000 down payment.
The real estate contract was contingent on the availability of financing the re-
maining $112,000 at a rate of no more than 12.25%. An additional provision
required the plaintiffs to increase their down payment, if necessary, to obtain a
loan at the stated rate. Plaintiffs submitted an application to First National
for the loan. A copy of the real estate contract, and a processing fee were sub-
mitted with the application.
This situation carries some similarity to a confidential or fiduciary rela-
tionship which make it easier for a plaintiff to recover under other theories.
See supra note 34 (describing fiduciary relationships). This vulnerable position
may have affected the court's opinion.
53. Other claims brought by plaintiffs included: breach of fiduciary duty,
prima facie tort, malicious interference with contract, gross negligence, and
negligence in processing a loan application. Jacques, 515 A.2d at 757-58.
54. Id-
55. Jacques v. First Nat'l Bank, 488 A.2d 210, 214-15 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1985).
56. Maryland's highest court.
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reasonable care.5 7 Significantly, the court based this tort duty
on a contractual relationship that it held to exist between the
mortgage applicants and the lender.58 The court reasoned that
because the plaintiffs suffered only economic harm, a tort duty
could arise only if a close relationship existed between the par-
ties.59 Contractual privity, the court held, was a sufficiently
close relationship to meet this requirement.60
The court then turned to the issue of whether contractual
privity existed on the facts. The court found mutual assent be-
tween Margaret and Robert Jacques and the lender in the
lender's processing of the loan application.61 The court con-
cluded that consideration also existed because the plaintiffs
paid a $144 loan processing fee and gave the lender a potential
economic benefit-the possibility of future profits from the
loan agreement.62 In return, the lender met the consideration
57. Because tort liability normally does not exist for pure economic harm,
the Jacques court based liability on the close relationship between the parties.
The court stated:
We discern from our review of the development of the law of tort
duty that an inverse correlation exists between the nature of the risk
on one hand, and the relationship of the parties on the other. As the
magnitude of the risk increases, the requirement of privity is re-
laxed-thus justifying the imposition of a duty in favor of a large class
of persons where the risk is of death or personal injury. Conversely,
as the magnitude of the risk decreases, a closer relationship between
the parties must be shown to support a tort duty. Therefore, if the
risk created by negligent conduct is no greater than one of economic
loss, generally no tort duty will be found absent a showing of privity
or its equivalent.
Jacques, 515 A.2d at 761.
Essential to this close relationship was the court's finding of a contract to
process the loan application: "Where the failure to exercise due care creates a
risk of economic loss only, courts have generally required an intimate nexus
between the parties as a condition to the imposition of tort liability. This inti-
mate nexus is satisfied by contractual privity or its equivalent." Id at 759-60
(footnote omitted).
58. Id at 761-62.
59. Id. at 759-61.
60. Id at 760-61.
61. Specifically, the court stated:
The Bank contends that there was no contract, and therefore no
legal relationship between it and the Jacques at the time of the al-
leged negligence. We disagree. The Bank made at least two express
promises to the Jacques. It agreed first to process their loan applica-
tion and second to "lock in" the interest rate of 11-7/8% for a period
of ninety days. If these promises were supported by valid considera-





requirement by agreeing to process the loan application.63 The
Jacques court found a promise to process the application with
reasonable care implicit in this agreement.64 Thus, a contrac-
tual relationship existed between the parties.65
Other courts have followed a similar rationale. A case
prior to Jacques, First Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Cau-
de, 66 held that potential profit alone can constitute considera-
tion.67 Caudle involved a lender who agreed to assist a
borrower in arranging a subsidized loan with the Department
of Housing and Urban Development. 68 Even though the lender
received no fees for its help, the court held that the economic
advantage the bank would receive if its efforts were successful
created sufficient consideration to support the existence of a
contract.
69
In addition to Caudle, subsequent case law has continued to
expand the lender's duty under Jacques to include negligent
misrepresentation 0 and has extended the Jacques tort duty to
physicians. 71 Plaintiffs even have attempted to use Jacques rea-
63. Id
64. Id. at 762.
65. Id.
66. 425 So. 2d 1050 (Ala. 1982).
67. Id. at 1052.
68. Id. at 1050-51.
69. The court noted:
Irrespective of the fact that First Federal did not receive any consid-
eration at the time the forms were filled out and filed with HUD,
First Federal would have nevertheless received, after the loan was ap-
proved, an origination fee of 1% of the total mortgage amount for
making the loan and also benefited as the lending institution making
a government subsidized loan at the prevailing mortgage interest
rates.
Id at 1052.
70. See Hill v. Equitable Bank, 655 F. Supp. 631, 650-51 (D. Del. 1987),
aff'd sub. nom. Hill v. Equitable Trust Co., 851 F.2d 691 (3d Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 1008 (1989). The plaintiffs in Hill sued defendant Equitable
Bank for, inter alia, negligent misrepresentation of the soundness of a limited
partnership in which the plaintiffs invested, using money borrowed from the
defendant. Hill, 655 F. Supp. at 650. The Hill court noted the similarity be-
tween the plaintiffs' position and that of the plaintiffs in Jacques, stating that
the plaintiffs had paid the defendant for a promise to fairly process the loan
and to provide accurate investment advice. Id. The Hill court held that this
promise by defendant gave rise to a legal duty. Id. at 650-51.
71. See Chew v. Meyer, 527 A.2d 828, 832 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1987). In
Chew, the defendant physician failed to fill out a form which explained the
plaintiff's absence from work, resulting in the plaintiff's termination. The
court held that even if the physician's contractual duty to provide medical care
did not include a duty to complete and submit the insurance form, under Jac-
ques, a sufficient intimate nexus existed to support a tort claim. Id.
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soning to sue lenders for negligently granting a loan request.72
In Jacques, the lender's tort liability was based in part on a
contract to process the loan application. 73 Also important to
the decision was the lender's knowledge that the plaintiffs were
in a uniquely vulnerable financial position because of an unu-
sual real estate agreement.74 The real estate agreement re-
quired that the Jacques proceed to settlement no matter what
financing they obtained or else lose a $10,000 deposit.75 Jacques
left open the question of whether courts would be willing to
find a contractual relationship between loan applicant and
lender in the absence of similarly unique facts.
IMMCO presented an opportunity for a court to determine
whether a contractual relationship exists between a loan appli-
cant and a lender in the absence of the particular Jacques fact
situation. Unlike Jacques, IMMCO involved contractual rather
than tort liability.76 Instead of individuals applying for a mort-
gage, the plaintiffs in IMMCO were sophisticated businessmen 77
bargaining on a level playing field in a commercial setting.78
Moreover, unlike the plaintiffs in Jacques, the IMMCO plain-
tiffs were not under pressure from a unique contractual
obligation.
72. See Hill, 851 F.2d at 699; Wagner v. Benson, 161 Cal. Rptr. 516, 520 (Ct.
App. 1980); Ebenhoh v. Production Credit Ass'n, 426 N.W.2d 490, 492-93 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1988); cf Schuyler State Bank v. Cech, 423 N.W.2d 464, 467 (Neb.
1988) (Plaintiff attempted to hold a lender liable for granting too large of a
loan in violation of a statute.).
73. Jacques v. First Nat'l Bank, 515 A.2d 756, 762 (Md. 1986).
74. The Jacques court state&
Examining further the relationship that existed between these par-
ties, we note that the rather extraordinary financing provisions con-
tained in the real estate sales contract, and thereby integrated into
the loan application, left the Jacques particularly vulnerable and de-
pendant upon the Bank's exercise of due care. The Jacques, while in-
dicating they would request a loan of $112,000, were required by
contract to proceed to settlement with whatever loan they could ob-
tain at the agreed rate of interest.... In accepting the loan applica-
tion for processing, the Bank had knowledge that the Jacques would
be legally obligated to either proceed to settlement with the loan de-
termined by the Bank or forfeit their deposit of $10,000.
Jacques, 515 A.2d at 762-63.
75. Id.
76. See IMMCO, 736 F. Supp. 587, 594 (D.N.J. 1990).
77. Id at 589-90. Abraham Bosman formerly was the president of a multi-
million dollar corporation and director of a bank. Id at 590. Plaintiff Steven
Fotos was experienced in world-wide coal shipment. Id Plaintiff Michael
Faleski was experienced in the business of supplying machinery for coal
processing. Id-
78. Id- at 590-93.
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II. JACQUES IN A COMMERCIAL SETTING: IMMCO v.
CITICORP
Three sophisticated businessmen 79 formed International
Minerals and Mining Corporation for the purpose of purchasing
a coal mine. 0 They contacted Citicorp to obtain a $21 million
loan.81 Local representatives of Citicorp initially were recep-
tive to the idea and began to investigate the proposal.8 2 Cit-
icorp drafted a proposal letter specifying a set of terms upon
which it would consider lending the money.8 3 The letter explic-
itly stated that Citicorp intended no commitment to the appli-
cant.84 After the applicants signed the proposal and gave
Citicorp a $20,000 good faith deposit, the proposal became a for-
mal application for a loan.s5
The IMMCO court, using an analysis similar to Jacques,
found a contract to process a loan application through the tradi-
tional approach of finding mutual assent and consideration.8 6
The letter from Citicorp to IMMCO was crucial to the court's
analysis.8 7 The letter contained a twenty-two-step process Cit-
icorp promised to follow in evaluating IMMCO's application.8 8
A note attached to the proposal read: "Citicorp Industrial
Credit Inc. is pleased to make the following financial proposal.
It should be emphasized that the following is only a letter of
79. See supra note 77.
80. IMMCO, 736 F. Supp. at 589.
81. I& at 590.
82. Id at 591. As reported by the court, Citicorp's loan application process
involves the following steps: (1) the applicant meets with local Citicorp repre-
sentatives; (2) the local representatives develop a working proposal of the
terms and conditions upon which a loan could be consummated; (3) the local
representatives draft a proposal letter listing the terms upon which Citicorp
would consider lending the money; (4) the proposal letter is submitted to the
borrower. If the borrower signs it and puts down a good faith deposit, the pro-
posal becomes a formal loan application. The deposit is non-refundable if the
loan application goes elsewhere. If the application is refused, the deposit is re-
turned once administrative costs have been deducted; (5) Citicorp undertakes
a "due diligence" period where it conducts a detailed analysis of the proposed
transaction; (6) the local representatives submit an initial credit memo to Cit-
icorp headquarters (in this case, 37 single-spaced, typed pages); (7) two senior
officers review the application, both of whom must recommend approval; (8)
in some cases, the loan must receive approval at the credit policy level with
Citicorp. I&L at 590.
83. Id at 591.
84. See infra note 89 and accompanying text.
85. IMMCO, 736 F. Supp. at 591.
86. Id at 595.
87. I& at 594.
88. Id at 591.
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proposal and is not intended nor should be construed to be a
commitment on the part of Citicorp. "89
The plaintiffs did not contend that this note constituted a
commitment to loan.90 Instead, they argued that the letter sat-
isfied the requirements of a bargain theory contract to process
the loan application. IMMCO first argued, and the court held,
that the letter manifested mutual assent between the parties to
process the loan application.91 The court reasoned that the let-
ter represented more than a unilateral offer on the part of the
lender.92 Rather, it constituted an integrated agreement be-
tween the parties to bargain in good faith regarding the possi-
ble loan.93
The court next determined that the promise to process the
application was supported by consideration.94 Citicorp gave
consideration under the contract by agreeing to consider
IMMCO's loan application. The court reasoned that Citicorp's
promise to process the loan application carried with it an im-
plied duty to carry out its obligations in a responsible manner.95
IMMCO also had given consideration. Citicorp made its prom-
ise in exchange for IMMCO's $20,000 good faith deposit and for
the prospect of profits if the loan were approved.96
Because New Jersey law imposes an obligation of good
faith and fair dealing on every contract,97 the court next ex-
amined whether Citicorp had lived up to this standard of good
faith in processing the loan application.98 The court failed to
define the precise standard required of a lender.99 Instead, it
89. Id (emphasis added by court).
90. Id.






97. The court described the New Jersey standard of good faith as follows:
In every contract there is an implied covenant that 'neither party
shall do anything which will have the effect of destroying or injuring
the right of the other party to receive the fruits of the contract; in
other words, in every contract there exists an implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing.' Where performance of a contract de-
pends upon the satisfaction by one party with the commercial per-
formance of another, the party holding the power to determine
whether or not performance is satisfactory must exercise that judg-
ment in good faith.
IMMCO, 736 F. Supp. at 595 n.7 (citations omitted).




focused its discussion on the procedures Citicorp followed, la-
belling them as "a Herculean effort."'' 0 0 The court also stated
that Citicorp's decision not to lend was reasonable given the cir-
cumstances, which included the difficulties the bank had in
documenting the value of IMMCO's collateral and an appear-
ance of dishonesty on the part of the plaintiffs.10 ' The court
therefore granted Citicorp's motion for summary judgment. 0 2
III. IMMCO LIABILITY: A DUTY TO PROCESS
COMMERCIAL LOAN APPLICATIONS
REASONABLY
In IMMCO, Citicorp explicitly expressed its desire not to be
bound by a commitment during the loan application process.10 3
Nonetheless, the court did bind Citicorp to a contractual obliga-
tion. 0 4 IMMCO held that a contractual relationship existed be-
tween the negotiating parties despite the lender's explicit
statement.10 5 This holding contradicts the traditional require-
ment of contract law that a party to a contract must manifest
intent to be bound by a contractual obligation. 06
The significance of IMMCO depends on the resolution of
two issues: a determination of the precise stage at which an
IMMCO contract is created and an evaluation of the specific du-
ties required by an IMMCO contract.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 596.
102. Id
103. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
104. IMMCO, 736 F. Supp. at 595. A plaintiff arguing for an IMMCO con-
tract may also cite other supporting cases. For example, in High v. McLean
Financial Corp., 659 F. Supp. 1561 (D.D.C. 1987), the court stated: "[P]laintiffs
maintain that District of Columbia law supports the existence of a contract 'at
the point the loan application is received and acted upon by the lender.' ...
The [clourt agrees that an implied contract may arise at that time." Id. at 1565
(emphasis added). A Sixth Circuit case, K.M.C. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d
752 (6th Cir. 1986), may also support the imposition of an IMMCO contract.
KM.C involved an agreement in which Irving Trust Company had extended a
line of credit to K.M.C. but then unreasonably refused to lend. Id. at 754.
K.M.C. recovered from Irving under a "breach of good faith" theory for
Irving's refusal to lend. Id. at 763. It is unclear from the case whether the par-
ties' original agreement constituted optional future advances or a contractual
commitment to make future advances. If the future advances were optional,
then the K.M.C. contractual commitment was identical to an IMMCO contract.
Of course, the Jacques court also found the existence of an IMMCO contract.
See supra notes 56-65 and accompanying text.
105. IMMCO, 736 F. Supp. at 595.
106. See supra note 8.
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A. ESTABLISHING AN IMMCO CONTRACT
1. Mutual Assent
The IMMCO decision raises the question of whether a
lender may undertake the processing of a loan application with-
out being bound by a contractual obligation. The court read the
language of the April 14th letter as "clearly evidenc[ing] a lack
of intent on Citicorp's part to be bound by any commitment un-
til it could reach a confidence level at which it felt able to fund
the purchase. 10 7 The court held, however, that the letter con-
stituted an enforceable contract. It stated that "[t]he letter
clearly constituted an integrated agreement to bargain in good
faith over the possibility of funding the assets."108  The only
way to reconcile these statements is to find mutual assent in-
herent in processing a loan application. 0 9
Such a reading of IMMCO suggests that once a lender
agrees to process the loan application, the lender and the loan
applicant have established mutual assent. Under traditional
contract law, once mutual assent is found, consideration is the
next element necessary to establish a contract between loan ap-
plicant and lender. 10
2. Consideration
Under bargain theory, a contract requires consideration.11
In an IMMCO contract the lender meets this requirement by
107. IMMCO, 736 F. Supp. at 594.
108. Id at 595.
109. The IMMCO court failed to address adequately the central issue in the
case. The IMMCO court made a compelling argument for distinguishing a con-
tract to loan and a contract to process a loan application. 736 F. Supp. at 594.
As the court recognized, however, the central issue in the case was whether
the letter signed by both parties constituted a contract to process the loan ap-
plication: "The more subtle question about which the parties do disagree,
however, is... whether Citicorp's decision [not to loan] is even reviewable by
this court." Id The opinion fails to deal adequately with this issue.
The court stated that "It is axiomatic that no contract exists in the ab-
sence of a mutual intent to be bound." Id It also found that Citicorp, in the
letter, "clearly evidence[d] a lack of intent.., to be bound by any commitment
... until... [it] successfully completed its credit evaluation." Id Nonetheless,
the court held that this very same letter "clearly constituted an integrated
agreement to bargain in good faith over the possibility of funding." Id at 595.
The court failed to explain how a single document can both clearly express a
desire not to be bound by any commitment and yet constitute an agreement.
This holding is simply inconsistent.
110. See supra note 8.
111. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 71-81 (1979).
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promising to consider the loan application." 2 The debtor's con-
sideration, however, raises more difficult problems.
In IMMCO, the court readily established consideration be-
cause the loan applicant had made a $20,000 dollar deposit. 1 3
The court also noted, however, that "both parties held mutually
optimistic expectations of making substantial profits."" 4
IMMCO was not the first case to suggest that potential eco-
nomic benefit alone can constitute consideration.115 The Jac-
ques court indicated that "business advantage" was sufficient
consideration," 6 and the court in First Federal Savings & Loan
Ass'n v. Caudle"-7 held that potential profit alone can consti-
tute consideration."18
Thus, IMMCO indicates that once a lender agrees to pro-
cess a loan application, the elements of a bargain theory con-
tract exist. The parties have mutually agreed that the lender
will consider the proposed loan. The loan applicant has con-
ferred potential economic benefit on the lender in exchange for
the lender's effort. These elements create an IMMCO contract
that imposes a common law duty of good faith and fair dealing
on the parties. The next logical step in analyzing the IMMCO
contract therefore involves determining the parameters of the
lender's duty of good faith and fair dealing.
B. GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING AS APPLIED TO A
CONTRACT TO PROCESS A LOAN APPLICATION
The obligation of good faith and fair dealing that IMMCO
imposed on defendant Citicorp raises two issues. The first issue
is whether the obligation applies to the procedures employed in
processing the loan application, to the actual substantive deci-
sion of whether to loan, or to both. The second issue is whether
the standard of good faith required of a lender is a subjective or
objective standard. The IMMCO decision failed to discuss these
issues explicitly.
112. IMMCO, 736 F. Supp. at 595.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. See First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Caudle, 425 So. 2d 1050 (Ala. 1982);
Jacques v. First Nat. Bank, 515 A.2d 756 (Md. 1986)
116. Jacques, 515 A.2d at 761 ("[IThe bank obtained a business advantage
and potential benefits sufficient to support its promise [to process the loan
application].").
117. 425 So. 2d 1050 (Ala. 1982).
118. Caudle, 425 So. 2d at 1052.
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1. Substance or Procedure? The Reach of the Standard of
Good Faith and Fair Dealing Imposed in IMMCO
Defining the scope of the duty of good faith is vital to de-
termining the clout of the IMMCO decision. A standard that
examines only a lender's procedure in processing a loan appli-
cation would impose a small burden. Under such a standard, a
lender could make any decision it wanted, as long as it followed
all of the steps it promised to follow. On the other hand, a
standard that examines the actual lending decision creates
great potential for litigation, litigation costs, and liability.
Every lending decision involves some degree of judgment that
might be questioned in a lawsuit. 119
Even though the IMMCO decision did not explicitly discuss
the scope of the standard of good faith, the court decided the
issue implicitly. Once the court found a contract, it was forced
to determine whether Citicorp had lived up to the standard as
imposed by the contract. °20 The court's analysis of Citicorp's
actions focused on the complicated procedure employed in
processing the loan application.-2' The court also discussed the
reasonableness of Citicorp's decision given the problems Cit-
icorp encountered in documenting the value of the assets
IMMCO pledged to secure the loan and the appearance of dis-
honesty on the part of the plaintiffs.122 At a minimum, the
IMMCO court considered the substantive decision a significant
factor in determining whether Citicorp had lived up to its
duty. 23 The IMMCO duty of good faith thus restricts the sub-
stantive decision a lender can make.124
119. In Jacques, the defendant lender argued that the process of evaluating
loan applications largely was judgmental and defied the imposition of a stan-
dard. The court rejected this argument by pointing out that tort standards are
imposed on medical doctors and motorists whose decisions are equally judg-
mental. Jacques, 515 A.2d at 764.
120. IMMCO, 736 F. Supp. at 595.
121. Id- at 595-96.
122. Id. at 596.
123. Id
124. By imposing a standard of reasonableness on a substantive lending de-
cision, IMMCO squarely presents the issue of what should control the obliga-
tions owed by a lender to a loan applicant: community standards of
reasonableness applied to a lender through an objective standard of good faith;
or no duty at all because the lender and loan applicant have not yet reached a
contractual relationship?
The Jacques opinion makes the argument that industry standards should
control lending decisions. Jacques, 515 A.2d at 764. The Jacques court whole-
heartedly embraced the imposition of tort liability for the negligent processing
of a loan application. The court reasoned that banks have a special "public
[Vol. 76:131
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2. Objective or Subjective? The Standard of Good Faith
Defined With Respect to Lending Decisions
The IMMCO decision apparently imposed an objective stan-
dard of good faith on Citicorp's decision not to loan. Although
the court did not explicitly define the duty it was imposing on
Citicorp, the decision discussed the common law duty of good
faith in New Jersey and found that standard implicit in the
contract between the parties.as The court construed the terms
of the contract as implying an objective standard, one which
commands reasonable action. 26 The court first discussed lend-
ing "in a responsible manner"'' and then addressed reasona-
bleness, stating that "[a]s long as Citicorp made this decision in
a reasonable manner, no liability can attach for the decision not
to fund."'128 A lender would be hard pressed to argue that this
language constitutes a subjective standard.129 "Good faith," as
defined in IMMCO, therefore requires an objective standard of
reasonableness.
IV. IMMCO's BROAD STRETCH
The IMMCO rationale could apply to a broad range of situ-
calling" because they are powerful and because vulnerable loan applicants are
at their mercy. I& at 762-63. The court likened banks to physicians, attorneys,
and insurance companies. I& at 763. A tort duty of care is placed upon such
professionals because of the public nature of their businesses. Id Hence, the
court concluded that a similar standard of care should be imposed on banks.
Id- at 764.
The IMMCO court did not make this argument. The IMMCO court ana-
lyzed the transaction solely by looking to the manifestations of intent of the
parties. The court found that the parties intended a contract to process the
loan application. IMMCO, 736 F. Supp. at 595. Thus, IMMCO held that a con-
tract to process the loan application existed. Id
125. The court stated:
Thus while Citicorp cites cases from Florida, Colorado, Indiana, and
Georgia for the proposition that the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing cannot be used to alter the express terms of an agreement,...
IMMCO has not argued that the terms of the agreement should be al-
tered, but rather that the terms of the agreement must be construed
and acted upon in good faith. There is nothing novel in this assertion.
IMMCO, 736 F. Supp. at 595 n.7.
126. In its opinion, the IMMCO court discussed its reasoning for granting
summary judgment on the factual issue of the commercial reasonableness of
Citicorp's actions. The entire discussion emphasizes reasonableness, including,
for example, the statement that "[o]n the facts of this case no room for doubt
exists as to the reasonableness of Citicorp's actions." Id at 596 n.8.
127. Id- at 595.
128. Id.




ations that clearly have never given rise to contractual obliga-
tions. It could apply, for example, when a stockbroker calls a
potential client with an investment opportunity. If the poten-
tial client listens, asks the stockbroker to send some literature,
and promises to consider the investment opportunity, no con-
ceivable contractual relationship would exist between the par-
ties in the absence of an IMMCO contract. The potential client
clearly would not owe the stockbroker a duty to make a good
faith decision.
Under IMMCO, however, the parties might have formed a
contract. First, mutual assent arguably exists. In IMMCO, the
plaintiff coal mine purchasers offered an investment opportu-
nity to Citicorp and Citicorp agreed to consider that opportu-
nity.130 In this scenario, the stockbroker offered a business
opportunity to the potential client, and the potential client
agreed to consider the opportunity. Similarly, consideration
could be found. IMMCO suggested that potential economic ben-
efit satisfies the need for consideration. The stockbroker in this
example offered potential economic benefit to the prospective
client. Thus, under the IMMCO analysis, the potential client
arguably owes the stockbroker a duty to make a reasonable de-
cision under their contract to evaluate the business
opportunity.
Few would seriously argue that the stockbroker scenario
constitutes an enforceable contract. Attempts to distinguish
the stockbroker example within the rubric of the IMMCO anal-
ysis, however, yield unsatisfactory results. The intent of the
parties in the two situations is identical. The IMMCO plaintiffs,
in substance, offered to Citicorp the same thing the stockbroker
offered the potential customer: an investment with risk at-
tached. In terms of consideration, the only possible distinction
between IMMCO and the stock investment opportunity is the
processing fee. Such a distinction is unsatisfactory, however,
because the element of potential economic benefit exists in
both situations.
The stockbroker situation is just one example of the wide
variety of situations to which an IMMCO contract could attach.
Under IMMCO, any time a person offers a potential customer
an investment opportunity with potential economic benefit to
the customer, and that customer agrees to consider the oppor-
tunity, a contract may exist.
130. IMMCO, 736 F. Supp. at 591.
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The IMMCO decision creates problems even if confined to
the banking community. It is difficult to determine the reason-
ableness of investment decisions. For example, the recent per-
formance of savings and loan institutions indicates that
industry standards do not provide a useful guide as to what sort
of investment is reasonable.
In addition, policy considerations do not support extending
a tort-like duty of reasonable care to commercial lending deci-
sions. Classic contract analysis governs commercial loan trans-
actions particularly well. Parties negotiate on a relatively level
playing field. They act with substantial knowledge of the sub-
ject being negotiated. Individuals seeking commercial loans are
businesspersons, not individuals at the mercy of the lending in-
stitution. If these businesspersons are dissatisfied with their
treatment, they will go elsewhere. Market forces have power-
ful influence on parties considering a large loan. Litigation
adds an unwanted and inefficient cog in the system. If ever the
legal system should leave parties free to make their own deci-
sions, it is in this situation.
V. PRESERVING THE IMPORTANCE OF CONSENT IN
CONTRACT LAW: AGREEMENTS TO BYPASS
IMMCO LIABILITY
Despite possible criticism of the IMMCO decision,13 1 the is-
sue remains whether lenders can do anything to protect them-
selves from IMMCO liability. The IMMCO court enforced a
contract to process the loan application despite the statement
that this arrangement "is not intended nor should [it] be con-
strued as a commitment on the part of Citicorp."'31 2 It is diffi-
cult to imagine that language could express a more explicit
intent not to be bound. Future courts faced with facts similar
to IMMCO therefore should enforce the parties' manifestations
of intent, including assertions of intent not to be bound.
Parties can help courts by clearly stating when they intend
to establish a contractual relationship. Assuming that a lender
wishes to avoid IMMCO liability, the following provision would
make that intent clear:
By undertaking to process this loan application, the parties do not
consent to be bound by a commitment of any kind. The parties in-
tend no obligations relating to this loan application, prior to the sign-
131. See supra note 109 (asserting that the IMMCO court failed to address
the case's major issue adequately).
132. See IMMCO, 736 F. Supp. at 591.
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ing of a written loan agreement. This application is a proposal only,
and does not constitute a contract to process the application.
This provision improves upon defendant Citicorp's provision in
three ways. First, instead of merely indicating an intent not to
be committed to making the loan, the provision indicates an in-
tent not to be bound by any commitment. The addition of the
phrase "of any kind" to the provision makes it more difficult
for the court to distinguish between a contract to loan and a
contract to process the loan application. The second advantage
of this provision is that it states precisely when, and in what
manner, the loan applicant and lender intend to establish a con-
tract. 33 A contract will exist only when the parties sign a writ-
ten loan contract. Finally, the provision explicitly rejects a
contract to process the loan application, making it difficult to
argue that consent to such an obligation was given.'3 Courts
wishing to apply contract principles faithfully to the loan
processing situation should uphold this provision.
CONCLUSION
Through the guise of bargain contract analysis and a duty
of good faith, the IMMCO decision imposes an objective stan-
dard of reasonableness on a commercial lender's decision to
loan. This decision represents an expansion of bargain theory
contract liability by functionally eliminating mutual assent as a
prerequisite to this type of contract. The IMMCO court failed
to defend this potential expansion in lender liability
sufficiently.
Under IMMCO, a contractual relationship and its attendant
duties could exist whenever a person proposes to do business
with another. Such proposals do not properly come within the
133. This provision is not an exculpatory clause that could give rise to argu-
ments that it contravenes public policy. See supra note 15 (discussing exculpa-
tory clauses). An exculpatory clause releases one party from liability for its
own negligence. This provision merely defines a condition that must take
place before the lender chooses to be bound by a contract.
134. The provision would also make it more difficult to prove Jacques tort
liability. The contract obligation was the vehicle by which the Jacques court
found a close enough relationship between the parties to impose a tort duty.
Jacques v. First Nat'l Bank, 515 A.2d 756, 762 (Md. 1986). In the absence of a
contract, a plaintiff would have a more difficult time showing this relationship.
Unless a court is willing to expand the Jacques holding to imply a contract to
process an application based entirely on the nature of the business of lending,
the agreement not to agree could be an effective tool. This provision would
make clear the parties' intent with respect to their potential contractual
relationship.
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scope of contract law. In addition, an IMMCO contract places
an undefined and ill-conceived duty of reasonableness on a
lender. By imposing societally-defined duties and objective
standards of behavior on commercial lending negotiations,
IMMCO is an unwarranted intrusion into the lending process.
The decision to make an investment should be left to the inves-
tor, not to the courts.

